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Abstract
We quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income
tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic, uninsurable
income shocks and permanent productivity di¤erences of households. The
optimal capital income tax rate is signicantly positive at 36%. The
optimal progressive labor income tax is, roughly, a at tax of 23% with
a deduction of $7; 200 (relative to average household income of $42; 000).
The high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life cycle
structure of the model whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor
income tax is attributable to the insurance and redistribution role of the
tax system.
Keywords: Progressive Taxes, Capital Taxation, Optimal Taxation
J.E.L. classication codes: E62, H21, H24
1 Introduction
Should the government tax capital income in the long run? The seminal contributions
of Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) answer this question negatively. Jones et al.
(1997), Chari and Kehoe (1999) and Atkeson et al. (1999) show that this result is
robust to a relaxation of a number of assumptions made by Chamley and Judd.
The literature has identied (at least) two modelling choices that may invalidate
the zero capital income tax result in the long run. First, Hubbard and Judd (1986),
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Aiyagari (1995) and Imrohoroglu (1998) have emphasized that if households face
tight borrowing constraints and/or are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic income
risk, then the optimal tax system will in general include a positive capital income
tax. Second, Alvarez et al. (1992), Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Garriga (2003)
show that in life cycle models the optimal capital income tax in general is di¤erent
from zero, at least if the tax code cannot explicitly be conditioned on the age of the
household.1 It is an open question, however, how large the optimal capital income
tax is, relative to the optimal labor income tax, in a realistically calibrated life cycle
model in which households face borrowing constraints and idiosyncratic income risk.
The goal of this paper is therefore to quantitatively characterize the optimal
capital and labor income tax in a model that nests both model elements previously
identied in the literature as having potential for generating positive capital income
taxes: incomplete capital markets and an explicit life cycle structure. In addition,
we allow agents to be heterogenous with respect to their innate ability to generate
income, modelled as a xed e¤ect in labor productivity. If society values an equitable
distribution of welfare this model element induces a positive redistributive role for
taxes. In this paper (in contrast to much of the literature) we allow the government
1Golosov et al. (2003) argue, in a Mirrleesian dynamic private information model with idiosyn-
cratic income shocks, for an optimal capital income tax rate that is ex-post di¤erent from zero,
but still equal to zero in expectation for each household. In a recent paper Weinzierl (2007) stud-
ies age-dependent labor income taxation in such a model. Hu¤man (2007) shows that the scal
authority may nd it optimal to both tax capital income and grant investment tax credits in a
model with endogenous investment-specic technical change. Albanesi and Armenter (2007) give
a su¢ cient condition such that (with optimal policy) equilibria in a class of models with innitely
lived households do not feature intertemporal distortions in the long run.
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to use progressive taxes, and we will demonstrate that the governments desire to
tax capital may depend on whether it has access to progressive labor income taxes.
In order to determine the optimal tax system we need to take a stand on the so-
cial welfare function to evaluate policies. The welfare criterion we employ is ex-ante
(before ability is realized) expected (with respect to idiosyncratic shocks) lifetime
utility of a newborn in a stationary equilibrium. Embedded in this welfare criterion
is a concern of the policy maker for insurance against idiosyncratic shocks and redis-
tribution across households with di¤erent ability, since transferring an extra dollar
from the highly able to the less able, ceteris paribus, increases social welfare since
the value function characterizing lifetime utility is strictly concave in the ability to
generate income.2 Such insurance and redistribution can be achieved by progressive
labor income taxes or taxation of capital income, or both. The policy maker then
has to trade o¤ this concern against the standard distortions these taxes impose on
labor supply and capital accumulation decisions.
We nd that the optimal capital income tax is signicantly positive at a rate
of 36%. The associated progressive labor income tax code is, to a rst approxima-
tion, a at tax of 23% with a deduction of $7; 200 (relative to a GDP per capita of
$42; 000). What explains this tax structure to be optimal? As Erosa and Gervais
(2002) and Garriga (2003) show theoretically, in life cycle models with endogenous
2One interpretation of our social welfare function is ex-ante (before the realization of permanent
productivity di¤erences) lifetime utility of a household to be born into the steady state. This
interpretation avoids the problem of comparing lifetime utility across di¤erent households. What
we call redistribution is, under this interpretation, insurance against low ability.
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labor supply it is typically optimal to tax labor at di¤erent ages at di¤erent rates.
In the absence of age-dependent labor income taxes a positive capital income tax
allows the government to achieve the same, as can a progressive labor income tax.3
Furthermore, in the presence of upward sloping life cycle earnings proles and tight
borrowing constraints it may be suboptimal to tax labor earnings of the young too
heavily, as Hubbard and Judd (1986) and Imrohoroglu (1998) suggest. Again, this
can be circumvented by either using the capital income tax more heavily or making
the labor income tax suitably progressive. With a sequence of thought experiments
that sequentially shut down certain elements of the model we show, in section 6, that
endogenous labor supplied di¤erentially over the life cycle is crucial in driving the
high capital income tax results whereas market incompleteness and distributional
concerns are mainly responsible for shaping the progressive labor income tax.
In an extensive sensitivity analysis we document that our results are qualita-
tively, and to a large part quantitatively, robust to a lower labor supply elasticity, to
allowing the capital income tax code to be progressive, to alternative values of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and to alternative specications of the social
welfare function. The introduction of government debt deserves a more qualied
statement. We show in section 6.3.5 that only in the rather extreme case in which
the government can accumulate so substantial negative government debt that it can
nance almost all government outlays by interest earned on these assets, the optimal
3For the preferences used in this paper the desire to tax age-dependently can in turn be related
to age-varying labor supply elasticities. We discuss this further in section 6.2.
5
capital income tax is zero (and the optimal labor income tax is close to zero as well).
Our study is related to the literature on the optimal progressivity of the income
tax code. Mirrlees (1971), Mirrlees (1974), Varian (1980), Benabou (2002) and Reiter
(2004) study the trade-o¤ between providing e¢ cient labor supply incentives on
one hand and generating an equitable after-tax income distribution or providing
income insurance on the other hand. We follow the tradition of this literature, but
take a quantitative approach as Altig et al. (2001), Ventura (1999), Castañeda et
al. (1999), Domeij and Heathcote (2001) and Nishiyama and Smetters (2005) in
their positive analyses of tax reforms. On the normative side, Bohacek and Kejak
(2004) and Conesa and Krueger (2006) characterize the optimal progressivity of the
income tax code, without allowing this tax code to di¤erentiate between labor and
capital income.4 Therefore these papers cannot contribute to the discussion about
the optimal capital income tax.
Section 2 describes the model and section 3 its calibration. In section 4 we explain
the tax experiments, with results presented in section 5. In section 6 we interpret
these results and provide extensive sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes.
4Conesa and Krueger (2006) nd an optimal tax code that is roughly a at tax with sizeable
deduction, as proposed by Hall and Rabushka (1995). Saez (2002) studies the optimal size of the
deduction in a representative agent model. Smyth (2005) characterizes the optimal capital and
labor income tax in a life cycle model that maximizes a weighted sum of lifetime utility of all agents
alive in the steady state. Since in his model households are identical at birth his analysis also does
not capture redistributive motives for taxation.
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2 The Economic Environment
2.1 Demographics
Time is discrete and the model is populated by J overlapping generations. In each
period a continuum of new households is born whose mass grows at rate n. Each
household faces a positive probability of death at each age. Let  j denote the condi-
tional survival probability from age j to age j+1: At age J agents die with probability
one,  J = 0: There are no annuity markets and therefore a fraction of households
leaves unintended bequests, denoted by Trt; that are redistributed in a lump-sum
manner across individuals currently alive. At an exogenous age jr, agents retire and
start to receive social security payments SSt, which are nanced by proportional
payroll taxes  ss;t, paid up to an income threshold y.
2.2 Endowments and Preferences
Households are endowed with one unit of time in each period of their lives and enter
the economy with no assets, besides transfers emanating from accidental bequests.
They spend their time supplying labor to a competitive market or consuming leisure.
Households are heterogeneous along three dimensions that a¤ect their labor pro-
ductivity. First, they di¤er by age in their average labor productivity "j, which
governs the average wage of an age cohort. Retired agents (those with j  jr) are
not productive at all, "j = 0. Second, we introduce permanent di¤erences in produc-
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tivity, standing in for di¤erences in education and innate abilities. We assume that
households are born as one of M possible ability types i 2 I; and that this ability
does not change over a households life cycle. The probability of being born with
ability i is denoted by pi > 0: This feature of the model, together with a social
welfare function that values equity, gives a welfare-enhancing role to redistributive
scal policies. Finally, workers of the same age and ability face idiosyncratic risk
with respect to their individual labor productivity. Let  2 E denote a generic real-
ization of this idiosyncratic labor productivity uncertainty in the current period: The
stochastic process for labor productivity status is identical and independent across
agents and follows a nite-state Markov chain with stationary transitions over time,
i.e.
Qt(; E) = Prob(
0 2 Ej) = Q(; E): (1)
We assume that Q consists of only strictly positive entries which assures that there
exists a unique, strictly positive, invariant distribution associated with Q which we
denote by : All individuals start their life with average stochastic productivity
 =
P
 (), where  2 E and () is the probability of  under the stationary
distribution. Di¤erent realizations of the stochastic process then give rise to cross-
sectional productivity distributions that become more dispersed as a cohort ages. In
the absence of explicit insurance markets for labor productivity risk a progressive
tax system is an e¤ective policy to share this idiosyncratic risk across agents.
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At any given time households are characterized by (a; ; i; j), where a are current
holdings of one period, risk-free bonds,  is stochastic labor productivity status, i is
ability type and j is age. A household of type (a; ; i; j) working lj hours commands
pre-tax labor income "ji`jwt; where wt is the wage per e¢ ciency unit of labor at
time t. Let t(a; ; i; j) denote the measure of agents of type (a; ; i; j) at date t.
Preferences over consumption and leisure fcj; (1   lj)gJj=1 are assumed to be
representable by a standard time-separable utility function of the form:
E
(
JX
j=1
j 1u(cj; 1  lj)
)
; (2)
where  is the time discount factor. Expectations are taken with respect to the
stochastic processes governing idiosyncratic labor productivity and mortality.
2.3 Technology
We assume that the aggregate technology can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas
production function. The aggregate resource constraint is given by:
Ct +Kt+1   (1  )Kt +Gt  AKt N1 t (3)
where Kt, Ct and Nt represent the aggregate capital stock, aggregate consumption
and aggregate labor input (measured in e¢ ciency units) in period t, and  denotes the
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capital share. The constant A normalizes units in our economy5, and the depreciation
rate for physical capital is denoted by .
2.4 Government Policy
The government engages in three activities: it spends resources, it levies taxes and it
runs a balanced budget social security system. The social security system is dened
by benets SSt for each retired household, independent of that households earnings
history. Social security taxes are levied up to a maximum labor income level y, as in
the actual U.S. system. The payroll tax rate  ss;t is set to assure period-by-period
budget balance of the system. We take the social security system as exogenously
given and not as subject of optimization of the policy maker.
Furthermore the government faces a sequence of exogenously given government
consumption fGtg1t=1 and has three scal instruments to nance this expenditure.
First it levies a proportional tax  c;t on consumption expenditures, which we take
as exogenously given in our analysis. Second, the government taxes capital income
of households, rt(a + Trt) according to a constant marginal capital tax rate K;t.6
Here rt denotes the risk free interest rate, a denotes asset held by the household, and
Trt denotes transfers from accidental bequests. Finally, the government can tax each
5We abstract from technological progress, since we will consider preference specications that
are not consistent with the existence of a balanced growth path, but allow us to endow households
with a labor supply elasticity consistent with microeconometric evidence, as well as a relative risk
aversion that is widely used in the literature.
6Section 6.3.2 will explicitly study under what conditions the scal authority might nd optimal
to introduce progressivity in capital income taxes.
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individuals taxable labor income according to a potentially progressive labor income
tax schedule T . Dene as ypt = wti"jlt a households pre-tax labor income, where
wt denotes the wage per e¢ ciency unit of labor. A part of this pre-tax labor income
is accounted for by the part of social security contributions paid by the employer
esst = 0:5 ss;tminfypt; yg which is not part of taxable income under current U.S.
tax law. Thus we dene as taxable labor income7
yt =
8><>: ypt   esst if j < jr0 if j  jr (4)
We impose the following restrictions on labor and capital income taxes. First, tax
rates cannot be personalized as we are assuming anonymity of the tax code. Second,
the capital income tax is a proportional tax, as described above. Labor income taxes,
in contrast, can be made an arbitrary function of individual taxable labor income in
a given period. We denote the tax code by T (yt): Our investigation of the optimal
tax code then involves nding the labor income tax function T and the capital tax
rate K that maximize a social welfare function, dened below.
7Social security benets are not taxable in our model. Such a tax would constitute a lump-sum
tax and here we follow our general approach and take the structure of the social security system as
exogenously given to focus on the optimal structure of the distortionary income tax system.
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2.5 Market Structure
We assume that workers cannot insure against idiosyncratic labor income uncertainty
by trading explicit insurance contracts. Also annuity markets insuring idiosyncratic
mortality risk are assumed to be absent. However, agents trade one-period risk free
bonds to self-insure against labor productivity risk. The possibility of self-insurance
is limited, however, by the imposition of a stringent borrowing constraint upon all
agents. In the presence of survival uncertainty, this feature of the model prevents
agents from dying in debt with positive probability.8
2.6 Denition of Competitive Equilibrium
In this section we will dene a competitive equilibrium and a stationary equilibrium.
Individual state variables are individual asset holdings a, individual labor productiv-
ity status ; individual ability type i and age j. The aggregate state of the economy
at time t is completely described by the joint measure t over asset positions, labor
productivity status, ability and age.
Let a 2 R+,  2 E = f1; 2; :::; ng, i 2 I = f1; : : : ;Mg, j 2 J = f1; 2; :::Jg,
and let S = R+  E I J. Let B(R+) be the Borel -algebra of R+ and P(E),
P(I); P(J) the power sets of E; I and J, respectively. Let M be the set of all nite
8If households were allowed to borrow, it may be optimal for an agent with a low survival
probability to borrow up to the limit, since with high probability she would not have to pay back
this debt. Clearly, such strategic behavior would be avoided if lenders could provide loans at
di¤erent interest rates, depending on survival probabilities. In order to keep the asset market
structure tractable we decided to prevent agents from borrowing altogether, in line with much of
the incomplete markets literature; see e.g. Aiyagari (1994) or Krusell and Smith (1998).
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measures over the measurable space (S;B(R+)P(E)P(I)P(J)).
Denition 1 Given a sequence of government expenditures fGtg1t=1 and consump-
tion tax rates f c;tg1t=1 and initial conditions K1 and 1; a competitive equilibrium
is a sequence of functions for the household, fvt; ct; a0t; ltg1t=1, production plans for
the rm, fNt; Ktg1t=1; government labor income tax functions fTt : R+ ! R+g1t=1,
capital income taxes fK;tg1t=1; social security taxes f ss;tg1t=1 and benets fSStg1t=1;
prices fwt; rtg1t=1; transfers fTrtg1t=1; and measures ftg1t=1; with t 2M such that:
1. given prices, policies, transfers and initial conditions, for each t, vt solves the
functional equation (with ct, a0t and `t as associated policy functions):
vt(a; ; i; j) = max
c;a0;`
fu(c; l) +  j
Z
vt+1(a
0; 0; i; j + 1)Q(; d0)g (5)
subject to
(1+ c;t)c+a
0 = wt"ji`  ss;tminfwt"jil; yg+(1+rt(1 K;t))(a+Trt) Tt[yt]; for j < jr;
(6)
(1 +  c;t)c+ a
0 = SSt + (1 + rt(1  K;t))(a+ Trt); for j  jr; (7)
a0  0; c  0; 0  l  1: (8)
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2. Prices wt and rt satisfy:
rt = A

Nt
Kt
1 
  ; (9)
wt = (1  )A

Kt
Nt

: (10)
3. The social security policies satisfy
 ss;t
Z
minfwti"jlt; ygt(daddidj) = SSt
Z
t(daddifjr; :::; Jg):
(11)
4. Transfers are given by:
Trt+1
Z
t+1(daddidj) =
Z
(1  j)a0t(a; ; i; j)t(daddidj) (12)
5. Government budget balance:
Gt =
Z
K;trt(a+ Trt)t(da d  di dj) +Z
Tt[yt]t(da d  di dj) +
 c;t
Z
ct(a; ; i; j)t(da d  di dj) (13)
6. Market clearing:
Kt =
Z
at(da d  di dj) (14)
14
Nt =
Z
"jilt(a; ; i; j)t(da d  di dj) (15)Z
ct(a; ; i; j)t(da d di dj)+Kt+1+Gt = AKt N1 t +(1  )Kt (16)
7. Law of Motion:
t+1 = Ht(t) (17)
where the function Ht :M!M can be written explicitly as follows. For all J
such that 1=2J :
t+1(AEIJ ) =
Z
Pt((a; ; i; j);AEIJ )t(daddidj) (18)
where
Pt((a; ; i; j);AEIJ ) =
8><>: Q(e; E) j0
if a0t(a; ; i; j) 2 A; i 2 I; j + 1 2 J
else
(19)
For J = f1g
t+1((A E  If1g) = (1 + n)t
8><>:
P
i2I pi
0
if 0 2 A;  2 E
else
(20)
Denition 2 A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which per
capita variables and functions as well as prices and policies are constant, and ag-
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gregate variables grow at the constant growth rate of the population n.
3 Functional Forms and Calibration
In order to carry out the numerical determination of the optimal tax code we rst
choose a model parameterization which we now describe.
3.1 Demographics
In our model households are born at age twenty (model age 1). They retire at model
age 46 (age 65 in real time) and die with probability 1 at model age 81 (age 100 in
the real world). The population grows at an annual rate of n = 1:1%; the long-run
average in the U.S. Finally our model requires conditional survival probabilities from
age j to age j+1;  j; which we take from the study by Bell and Miller (2002). Table
I summarizes our choices for all parameters (also the ones to come).
3.2 Preferences
Households have time-separable preferences over consumption and leisure and dis-
count the future with factor : Because our results will point to the labor supply
elasticity as a key determinant of our ndings we consider two specications of the
period utility function. As benchmark we assume a standard Cobb-Douglas speci-
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cation
u(c; 1  l) = (c
(1  l)1 )1 
1   (21)
where  is a share parameter determining the relative importance of consumption,
and  determines the risk aversion of the household.9 We set  = 4 and choose  and
 such that the stationary equilibrium of the economy with benchmark tax system
(as described below) features a capital-output ratio of 2:7 and an average share of
time worked of one-third of the time endowment.10 The calibrated values of  and
 imply that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is approximately 0.5.
Microeconometric studies tend to restrict attention to white males of prime age
already employed and obtain values for the Frisch elasticity smaller than one. We
take as decision unit in our model the household. It therefore seems reasonable
that the labor supply elasticity might be higher than the low estimates implied by
traditional microeconometric studies, due to both higher labor supply elasticities of
females and the existence of an extensive margin that is not usually considered in
the empirical estimation of labor supply elasticities.11
9The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion in consumption is given by   cuccuc =  + 1  :
10It is understood that in any general equilibrium model all parameters a¤ect all equilibrium
entities. We associate a parameter with the equilibrium entity it a¤ects quantitatively most.
11Heckman (1993) suggests that the elasticity of participation decisions is large. Most of the
movement in aggregate hours worked is due to this extensive margin. Imai and Keane (2004) argue
that the individual intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply is higher than usually
estimated in a framework with endogenous human capital accumulation, possibly as high as 3.82.
Domeij and Floden (2006) show that the presence of uninsurable labor income risk and borrowing
constraints biases the estimated individual labor supply elasticities downwards. Finally, Kimball
and Shapiro (2005) use preferences that are homothetic in hours worked where the substitution and
income e¤ects exactly cancel each other and obtain a Frisch labor supply elasticity around 1, equal
to the one implied in our benchmark economy.
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Table I: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Target
Demographics
Retir. Age jr 46 (65) Compul. Ret. (assumed)
Max. Age J 81 (100) Certain Death (assumed)
Surv. Prob.  j Bell and Miller (2002) Data
Pop. Growth n 1:1% Data
Preferences
Discount Factor  1:001 K=Y = 2:7
Risk Aversion  4:0 IES = 0:5
Consumption Share  0:377 Avg. Hours= 1
3
Labor Productivity Process
Variance Types 2 0:14 V ar(y22)
Persistence  0:98 Lin. Incr. in V ar(yj)
Variance Shock 2 0:0289 V ar(y60)
Technology
Capital Share  0:36 Data
Depreciation Rate  8:33% I=Y = 25:5%
Scale Parameter A 1 Normalization
Government Policy
Consumption Tax  c 5% Mendoza et al. (1994)
Marginal Tax 0 0:258 Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
Tax Progressivity 1 0:768 Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
Payroll Tax  ss 12:4% Data
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Given the di¢ culty to empirically pin down the labor supply elasticity for our
model, we conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to the labor supply elasticity by
considering an alternative preference specication that allows us to choose a lower
elasticity than in our benchmark. This alternative is given by
u(c; 1  l) = c
1 1
1  1 + 
(1  l)1 2
1  2 (22)
We discuss the calibration of the parameters (1; 2; ) in section 6.3.1.
3.3 Labor Productivity Process
A households labor productivity depends on three components: a deterministic
age-dependent component "j; a type-dependent xed e¤ect i and a persistent, idio-
syncratic shock . The natural logarithm of wages of a household is given by
log(wt) + log("j) + log(i) + log() (23)
The age-productivity prole f"jgjr 1j=1 is taken from Hansen (1993). We consider
two ability types, with equal population mass pi = 0:5 and xed e¤ects 1 = e  and
2 = e
 ; so that E(log(i)) = 0 and V ar(log(i)) = 2: Furthermore, we specify
the stochastic process for the idiosyncratic part of log-wages as a discretized ver-
sion, with seven states, of a simple AR(1) process with persistence parameter  and
unconditional variance 2: This choice gives us the three free parameters (
2
; ; 
2
)
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to choose. With their choice we target three statistics from data measuring how
cross-sectional labor income dispersion evolves over the life cycle. Storesletten et al.
(2004) document that i) at cohort age 22 the cross-sectional variance of household
labor income is about 0:2735; ii) at age 60 it is about 0:9 and iii) that it increases
roughly linearly in between. In our model labor supply and therefore labor earn-
ings are endogenous, responding optimally to the labor productivity process. We
choose the three parameters (2; ; 
2
) so that in the benchmark parameterization
the model displays a cross-sectional household age-earnings variance prole consis-
tent with these facts. The implied parameter values are summarized in Table I.
3.4 Technology
The capital share parameter  is set to the empirical capital share,  = 0:36; a stan-
dard value in the literature.12 The depreciation rate is set to match an investment-
output ratio of 25:5% in the data (investment includes nonresidential and residential
xed investment and purchases of consumer durables). This requires  = 8:3%:13
3.5 Government Policies and the Income Tax Function
The government in our model (meant to stand in for all levels, federal, state and
local in the real world) consumes resources, collects tax revenues and operates a
12For example, Castañeda et al. (1999) choose  = 0:376 and Domeij and Heathcote use  = 0:36:
13Note that our parameter choices yield a benchmark real interest rate of 5%; and with population
growth of 1:1% the economy is deep in the dynamically e¢ cient region.
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social security system. The focus of our analysis of the government is the income tax
code. We therefore take the other parts of government activity as exogenously given
and calibrate the extent of these activities to observed data. We choose government
spending G so that it accounts for 17% of GDP in the initial stationary equilibrium.
G is kept constant across our tax experiments; therefore if an income tax system
delivers higher output in equilibrium, the corresponding G
Y
ratio declines.
Part of tax revenues are generated by a proportional consumption tax, whose
size we take as exogenous and set to  c = 5%; following Mendoza et al. (1994).
Furthermore the government runs a pay-as-you-go social security system, dened by
a payroll tax. This tax takes a value of 12:4% of labor income up to a limit of 2.5
times average income,14 with benets determined by budget balance of the system.
We want to determine the optimal income tax function. Ideally one would im-
pose no restrictions on the set of tax functions the government can choose from.
Maximization over such an unrestricted set is computationally infeasible, however.
Therefore we restrict the set of tax functions to a exible three parameter family. If
y is taxable income, total taxes are given by
TGS(y;0; 1; 2) = 0

y   (y 1 + 2) 
1
1

; (24)
where (0; 1; 2) are parameters. This functional form, proposed by Gouveia and
Strauss (1994), has been employed in the quantitative public nance literature by
14The limit of earnings subject to the payroll tax changes every year, which is $102,000 in 2008.
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Castañeda et al. (1999), Smyth (2005) and Conesa and Krueger (2006). Roughly
speaking, 0 controls the level of the average tax rate and 1 determines the progres-
sivity of the tax code. For 1 ! 0 the tax system reduces to a pure at tax, while
other values encompass a wide range of progressive and regressive tax functions.
Without discriminating between capital and labor income Gouveia and Strauss
(1994) estimate the parameters (0; 1; 2) that best approximate taxes paid under
the actual US income tax system and nd 0 = 0:258 and 1 = 0:768: We use
their estimated tax system (applied to the sum of labor and capital income) as
benchmark, for calibration and comparison purposes. The parameter 2 adjusts to
ensure government budget balance.
4 The Computational Experiment
Dene yl and yk as taxable labor and capital income, respectively. The set of tax
functions the government optimizes over is given by
T = Tl(yl); Tk(yk) : Tl(yl) = TGS(yl;0; 1; 2) and Tk(yk) =  kyk	 (25)
and thus by the four parameters (0; 1; 2;  k), one of which (we take 2) is deter-
mined by budget balance. Thus we allow for a exible labor income tax code, but
restrict capital taxes to be proportional, an assumption that assures computational
feasibility and makes the comparison to existing studies employing the same assump-
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tion easier. Also note that the choices of (0; 1;  k) are restricted by the requirement
that there has to exist a corresponding 2 that balances the budget.
The remaining ingredient of our analysis is the social welfare function ranking
di¤erent tax functions. We assume that the government wants to maximize the ex-
ante lifetime utility of an agent born into the stationary equilibrium implied by the
chosen tax function. The governments objective is thus given by
SWF (0; 1;  k) =
Z
v(0;1;k)(a = 0;  = ; i; j = 1)d(0;1;k) (26)
Given that all newborn households start with zero assets and average labor produc-
tivity, social welfare is simply equal to average expected lifetime utility across the
two ability groups.15
5 Results
5.1 The Optimal Tax System
The optimal tax system is given by a tax rate on capital of  k = 36% and a labor
income tax characterized by the parameters 0 = 23% and 1  7: Therefore the
labor income tax code is basically a at tax with marginal rate of 23% and a deduction
15Here v(0;1;k) and (0;1;k) are the value function and invariant cross-sectional distribution
associated with tax system characterized by (0; 1; k):
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of about $7; 200 (relative to average income of $42; 000).16
5.2 Comparison with the Benchmark
In order to assess the importance of the tax code for equilibrium allocations Table
II compares equilibrium statistics for the optimal and the benchmark tax system.
Table II: Changes in Aggregate Variables in the Optimal Tax System
Variable
Average Hours Worked  0:56%
Total Labor Supply N  0:11%
Capital Stock K  6:64%
Output Y  2:51%
Aggregate Consumption C  1:63%
ECV 1:33%
We observe that under the optimal tax system capital drops substantially below
the level of the benchmark economy. Consequently aggregate output and aggregate
consumption fall as well. This is an immediate consequence of the heavy tax on
capital income in the optimal tax system, relative to the benchmark (where the
highest marginal tax rate is 25:8%). The change in taxes also induces adjustments in
16In section 6.3.2 we show that given our social welfare function it is not welfare enhancing to
introduce progressivity of the capital income tax schedule. According to our results all progressivity
of the tax code should be embedded in the labor income tax schedule.
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labor supply. While average hours worked drop by 0:56%, labor e¢ ciency units drop
by only 0:11%; thus labor supply shifts from less to more productive households.
5.2.1 Decomposition of the Welfare E¤ects
Given the substantial decline in aggregate consumption and the only modest decline
in average hours worked in the optimal tax system, relative to the benchmark, it
is surprising that the optimal tax system features substantially higher aggregate
welfare, equivalent to a 1:33% increase in consumption at all ages and all states of the
world, keeping labor supply allocations unchanged.17 Given the form of the utility
function, the welfare consequences of switching from a steady state consumption-
labor allocation (c0; l0) to (c; l) are given by
CEV =

W (c; l)
W (c0; l0)
 1
(1 )
  1 (27)
where W (c; l) is the expected lifetime utility at birth of a household, given a tax
system. We can decompose CEV into a component stemming from the change in
consumption from c0 to c; and one from the change in leisure. The consumption
impact on welfare can itself be divided into a part that captures the change in average
consumption, and a part that reects the change in the distribution of consumption
(across types, across the life cycle and across states of the world). The same is true
17Note that if one imposes zero capital income taxes and let the government optimize over labor
income taxes, the welfare losses for not using capital income taxes are substantial: 2% relative to
the unconstrained optimum and 0:7% relative to the benchmark system.
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for labor supply (leisure).18
Table III shows that the welfare gains stem from a better allocation of consump-
tion across types and states of the world, and from a reduction of the average time
spent working. This more than o¤sets the lower average level of consumption and
the less favorable, in utility terms, distribution of leisure over the life cycle.
Table III: Decomposition of Welfare
Total Change 1:33%
Consumption
8>>>>><>>>>>:
Total
Level
Distribution
1:29%
 1:63%
2:97%
Leisure
8>>>>><>>>>>:
Total
Level
Distribution
0:04%
0:41%
 0:37%
18Let CEVC and CEVL be dened as
W (c; l0) = W (c0(1 + CEVC); l0)
W (c; l) = W (c(1 + CEVL); l0):
Then it is easy to verify that 1 +CEV = (1 +CEVC)(1 +CEVL) or CEV  CEVC +CEVL: We
further decompose CEVC into a level e¤ect CEVCL and a distribution e¤ect CEVCD:
W (c^0; l0) = W (c0(1 + CEVCL); l0)
W (c; l0) = W (c^0(1 + CEVCD); l0)
where c^0 = (1+ gC)c0 = CC0 c0 is the consumption allocation resulting from scaling the allocation c0
by the change in aggregate consumption CC0 : A simple calculation shows that the level e¤ect equals
the growth rate of consumption CEVCL = CC0   1. A similar decomposition applies to leisure.
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5.2.2 Life Cycle Proles of Assets, Labor, Consumption and Taxes
As we argue below a nontrivial life cycle prole of hours worked and consumption is
crucial for our capital income tax result. In this subsection we therefore document
the life cycle pattern of asset holdings (the relevant tax base for the capital income
tax), labor income (the relevant tax base for labor income taxes), consumption and
taxes paid. In the upper-left panel of gure 1 we display average asset holdings by
age for both productivity types of households, for the benchmark and the optimal
tax system. We observe the hump-shaped behavior of assets that is typical of any
life cycle model. This prole implies that the main burden of the capital income
tax is borne by households aged 40 to 70. In addition, the negative impact on asset
accumulation of higher capital income taxes in the optimal, relative to the benchmark
tax system, is clearly visible. Therefore aggregate assets and capital decline by 6:6%.
The upper right panel of Figure 1 documents the life cycle pattern of labor supply.
First we note that, independent of the tax system, labor supply tends to fall over
the life cycle despite the fact that labor productivity only peaks at age 50. This
fact, crucial for explaining the optimal capital income tax result in section 6, is
mainly driven by the fact that with a calibrated  > 1 and a substantially positive
(after tax) return it is benecial for households to postpone leisure to older ages.
Second, we observe that the optimal tax code, relative to the benchmark, induces
households to work more at ages at which they are more productive. Lower labor
income taxes and the sizeable deduction induce an allocation of labor supply that
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follows more closely the age-e¢ ciency prole optimal, as it alleviates the severity
of the borrowing constraint early in life. Especially for the low-skilled group the
increase in labor supply at age 50 to 60 is substantial, indicating a high elasticity of
hours with respect to marginal labor income taxes for this group. Overall the optimal
tax system induces a atter life cycle prole of labor supply and thus leisure.
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Figure 1: Life Cycle Proles of Assets, Labor Supply, Consumption and Taxes
The lower left panel of Figure 1 documents the life cycle consumption pattern; it
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displays an empirically plausible hump over the life cycle and discrete fall at the time
of retirement, due to the nonseparability between consumption and leisure. Relative
to the benchmark tax system a larger capital income tax makes future consumption
more expensive and thus attens its prole. Finally, the lower right panel of Figure
1 displays the life cycle prole of taxes paid. The gure rst demonstrates that the
optimal tax code leads to substantially more redistribution across types, by taxing
more heavily the high-skilled, high labor income-earners who also hold a large fraction
of nancial assets in the economy, especially at ages 40 to 60. Second, since under
the optimal tax code households aged 40 to 60 work more than under the benchmark,
they pay higher labor income taxes (despite the fact that their marginal tax rates
have been reduced). Finally, the higher capital income taxes of the optimal system
explain why retired capital holders pay a larger tax bill under this system.
6 Interpretation and Sensitivity of the Results19
To isolate the driving forces for our two quantitative results, a signicantly positive
capital income tax and a labor income tax schedule that is progressive due to a
substantial deduction we now show which model elements are responsible for these
ndings. The crucial model elements include i) an endogenous labor-leisure choice,
formally represented by a  < 1 in the utility function, ii) a tight borrowing constraint
19The proofs of various claims in this section are contained in a separate appendix
available at http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~dkrueger/research/taxapp.pdf
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a0  0, iii) ex-ante heterogeneity in labor productivity, 2 > 0; iv) idiosyncratic
income risk, driven by the Markov chain for labor productivity ; that is 2 > 0;
and v) model elements that let households undergo a meaningful life cycle, such as
idiosyncratic mortality risk,  j < 1; a nontrivial life cycle prole of wages "j 6= 1;
and a PAYGO social security system,  ss > 0 and SS > 0.
Table IV: Summary of Quantitative Results20
End.21 Life
Model Lab. BC Type Idio. Cyc.  r  k  l Prog.
M1 No No No No No 0.983 4.5% 10% 19% No
M2 No No No No Yes 1.001 3.2% -24% 100% Yes
M3 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 1.001 4.3% -34% 100% Yes
M4 Yes No No No No 0.979 4.7% 20% 17% No
M5 Yes No No No Yes 1.009 5.6% 34% 14% No
M6 Yes No Yes No Yes 1.009 5.2% 32% 18% Yes
M7 Yes No Yes Yes Yes 1.005 5.6% 35% 23% Yes
Bench Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 1.001 5.6% 36% 23% Yes
20In the table,  l gives the marginal tax rate on labor as labor earnings tend to innity. In a
at tax system (with or without deduction) it is the common marginal tax rate. The column Prog.
simply indicates whether the optimal labor tax system is signicantly progressive.
21End. Lab. stands for model element i) labor being chosen endogenously, BC indicates ii)
the presence of a tight borrowing constraint, Type implies iii) the presence of ex-ante productivity
heterogeneity, Idio. iv) the presence of idiosyncratic income risk, and Life Cyc. indicates v) the
presence of the life cycle model elements listed in the main text.
30
Table IV summarizes the optimal tax code in various versions of our model where
various combinations of these elements are shut down. The benchmark model ana-
lyzed so far, the last row of the table, includes all ve model elements. In all models
parameters have always been re-calibrated to match (with the Gouveia-Strauss tax
function) the same targets as in the benchmark. We observe the following. First,
without labor being supplied elastically no robust argument can be made for signi-
cantly positive capital income taxes. Second, the size of the optimal capital income
tax when households choose how much to work depends crucially on the presence of
realistic life cycle elements of the model. Third, while type heterogeneity and idiosyn-
cratic earnings risk are key determinants of the progressivity of labor income taxes,
the nding that a large capital income tax is optimal does not hinge on these model
elements. Finally, we nd that borrowing constraints are not crucial for our optimal
capital income tax results if labor income taxes are permitted to be progressive. We
now discuss these ndings in more detail.
6.1 Inelastic Labor Supply
To argue that endogenous labor supply being chosen over a realistically modeled life
cycle is crucial for our optimal capital income tax results we briey present optimal
tax results for versions of the model with exogenous labor supply. In these model
variants the labor income tax is a lump-sum tax. Thus it is not surprising that we
nd that no robust case for positive capital income taxes can be made with exogenous
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labor supply.
In the most basic OLG model in which households live for J periods, only value
consumption in their time separable lifetime utility function and face no risk or bor-
rowing constraints, the population grows at rate n; capital depreciates at rate  and
(per capita of the youngest generation) output is produced according to a neoclassical
production function f(K) with standard properties, and used for private consump-
tion, investment and government spending G; a social planner whose objective is
to maximize steady state lifetime utility of a newborn agent will choose the capital
stock to satisfy the golden rule f 0(K) =  + n: Furthermore the socially optimal
allocation can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium in which the government
chooses  k = 0; as long as there are no restrictions on government debt. However,
if government debt is restricted to zero (that is, period by period budget balance is
imposed) there is no guarantee that with  k = 0 private asset demand equals the
capital stock K. Therefore, in the absence of (negative) government debt, even in
this simple model the optimal capital income tax is not necessarily equal to zero.
When we recalibrate parameters to the same empirical targets as in the benchmark22
we nd that in the model without government debt the optimal capital income tax
is 10% and the associated labor income tax equals  l = 19% as shown in Table IV
(row M1). We return to the restrictions the absence of government debt imposes on
the optimal tax code in section 6.3.5.
22The parameters are =2, =0.9825, =0.36,  =0.0833 and n=0.011.
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However, the absence of government debt alone does not generate a robust reason
for positive capital income taxes in models with exogenous labor supply. Adding all
life cycle elements to the model yields an optimal capital income tax of approximately
 k = 0 if the labor income tax is restricted to be proportional.23 If the government
can tax labor progressively, it does so drastically, as the 100% marginal tax rate in
row M2 in Table IV shows. The optimal capital income tax becomes substantially
negative,  24%: For a given consumption prole, shifting after tax labor income
towards younger ages through highly progressive taxes increases aggregate saving
and thus the capital stock and the level of aggregate consumption.
The model with exogenous labor supply can also be used to most clearly show how
e¤ectively progressive labor income taxes can deal with the problem of potentially
binding borrowing constraints. Hubbard and Judd (1986) and Imrohoroglu (1998)
show that in life cycle models where households face upward-sloping labor earnings
proles and tight borrowing constraints the government should not rely on labor
income taxes alone, since high labor income taxes translate directly into low con-
sumption for young households at the constraint.24 However, if the labor income tax
code is allowed to be progressive it is possible to tax young, borrowing constrained
households with lower labor earnings at lower rates than older households. Adding
tight borrowing constraints and idiosyncratic risk (as well as type heterogeneity) to
23If  is kept the same as before, then optimal capital income tax with proportional labor income
tax roughly remains at its previous optimum of 10%:
24This e¤ect can be especially severe, as Imrohoroglu (1998) argues, if households in addition
face idiosyncratic income shocks.
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the model conrms our previous ndings. Restricting the government to proportional
labor income taxes the optimal capital income tax is signicantly positive at 24%,
despite the fact that the labor income tax remains a lump-sum tax. This capital
income tax is higher than in the model without borrowing constraints, as suggested
by the results of Imrohoroglu (1998). However, as soon as we allow the labor income
tax to be progressive, Table IV (row M3) shows that the optimal capital income tax
is  34%; nanced by a high marginal labor income tax with substantial deduction.
The nding that tight borrowing constraints do not provide a strong rationale for
capital income taxes if labor income taxes are allowed to be progressive continues to
hold with endogenous labor supply, as our results below indicate.
6.2 Elastic Labor Supply
The main lesson we draw from the previous subsection is that labor supply endoge-
nously chosen over the life cycle is a necessary ingredient of our optimal tax result.
In this subsection we rst review what can be said theoretically about the optimal
tax structure in life cycle models with endogenous labor supply and then decompose
our quantitative results further.
6.2.1 Theory
Atkeson et al. (1999), Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Garriga (2003) analyze theo-
retically the optimal tax structure in OLG models without idiosyncratic risk, type
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heterogeneity and the restriction to proportional, albeit potentially age-dependent
tax schedules. To provide the cleanest intuition for our quantitative results, suppose
that households live only two periods, value consumption and leisure in both peri-
ods, and have labor productivity of 1 when young and " when old. The production
technology is given by F (K;L) = rK + L so that the marginal product of capital
is constant at r and the marginal product of labor is constant at 1: The benevo-
lent government maximizes social welfare25 by choosing (potentially age-dependent)
proportional labor and capital income taxes and uses government debt to satisfy its
sequence of budget constraints.
With these assumptions several analytical results can be derived.26 First, sup-
pose that preferences are separable between consumption and leisure and obey the
functional form specied in (22); the case we analyze quantitatively in section 6.3.1.
Then, if labor income taxes can be conditioned on age, in the steady state the op-
timal capital income tax equals zero and the optimal age-dependent labor income
tax rates satisfy  l1 >  l2 if and only if l1 > l2 (if labor supply is falling over the
life cycle). That is, labor is taxed at a higher rate when it is high. Since with these
preferences the Frisch labor supply elasticity is given by "l = 1 l2l , this can be restated
as labor being taxed more heavily when it is supplied less elastically.
25Social welfare is a weighted sum of lifetime utilities of current and future generations.
26Similar results for more general life cycle environments are contained in Atkeson et al. (1999),
proposition 7, Erosa and Gervais, section 4.2 and Garriga (2003), proposition 4. The purpose
of our discussion is not to claim originality, but to provide the clearest possible intuition for our
quantitative results.
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If labor income taxes cannot be conditioned on age, the optimal long-run capital
income tax is zero only if labor supply does not undergo a life cycle, that is, if l1 =
l2: Denoting by Uli the marginal disutility from work the intertemporal optimality
condition governing labor supply reads as
"Ul1
Ul2
= (1 + r(1   k))(1   l1)
(1   l2) :
The same intertemporal wedge can be generated with a combination of ( l1 >  l2 and
 k = 0) and with ( l1 =  l2 and  k > 0). Thus a positive capital income tax mimics
a labor income tax that is falling with age. This role of capital income taxes has to
be traded o¤ against the distortion for the intertemporal consumption allocation.
If the period utility function is of the Cobb-Douglas form (21); the case for nonzero
capital income taxes is strengthened. Now, even if labor income taxes can be con-
ditioned on age, the capital income tax in general is nonzero. In particular, if labor
supply falls over the life cycle (as it does in our quantitative model), then the optimal
capital income tax is positive (as long as  > 1 which we assume in the quantitative
model). Furthermore, the labor supply prole determines both the optimal prole
of age-dependent labor income taxes as well as the sign of the capital income tax.
Note that the previous argument that a positive capital income tax can be used to
generate the same intertemporal tax wedge as a labor income tax that is declining
with age continues to apply.
To summarize, endogenous labor supply coupled with life cycle model elements
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that generate a non-constant age labor supply prole implies a robust role for positive
capital income taxation, as long as the government cannot condition the tax code
on age (and in the nonseparable case, even with age-dependent labor income taxes).
The capital income tax implicitly allows the government to tax leisure (labor) at
di¤erent ages at di¤erent rates. Since labor at di¤erent ages is supplied with di¤erent
elasticities, the government makes use of the capital income tax for this reason.
6.2.2 Quantitative Findings
The theoretical discussion has argued that in a life cycle model in which household
labor supply changes with age, if the government cannot condition the tax function
on age it optimally uses the capital income tax to mimic age-dependent labor income
taxes. The literature on optimal taxation in the Ramsey tradition restricts attention
to proportional taxes. However, our analysis of the model with exogenous labor
supply has demonstrated that progressive labor income taxes can also be used as a
tool for taxing households of di¤erent ages at di¤erent rates. But if labor supply is
endogenous progressive taxes have adverse incentive e¤ects. Quantitative analysis
is required to determine the extent to which capital income tax and the progressive
labor income tax are used to tax labor at di¤erent ages at di¤erent rates.27
In the simplest quantitative model with endogenous labor supply that abstracts
from idiosyncratic risk, household heterogeneity and life cycle elements (apart from
27Gervais (2004) studies the desirability of a progressive income tax system implied by a log-linear
tax function using a life-cycle model similar to ours.
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nite life), the capital income tax is quantitatively signicant at 20% (see row M4
in Table IV). Its size is, however, only about half of that in the benchmark model,
for reasons explained below. The calibrated parameters imply that for all  k in
equilibrium (1 + r(1    k)) > 1: Therefore consumption and leisure increase over
the life cycle. As our theoretical discussion above suggests, labor at older ages should
be taxed less heavily than labor at younger ages. In the absence of age-dependent
labor income taxes a positive capital income tax achieves this.28
Adding life cycle elements into the model (social security, mortality risk, and
age-dependent labor productivity) strongly a¤ects the optimal life cycle prole of
consumption and leisure, and incentives to save.29 In order to achieve the same
empirical target the newly calibrated time discount factor increases to  = 1:009;
see row M5 in table IV. This in turn generates consumption and leisure proles
that are more strongly upward sloping, relative to model M4. As a consequence
the optimal capital income tax, inducing indirect age-dependent leisure taxation,
rises to 34%; with a labor income tax that is proportional with a marginal rate of
14%: Thus a fully articulated life cycle model with endogenous labor supply but no
intracohort heterogeneity implies an optimal capital income tax almost as high as in
the benchmark model, but an essentially proportional optimal labor income tax.
28With a at labor e¢ ciency prole and declining labor supply over the life cycle earnings decline
with age. Thus a progressive labor income tax allows the government to tax older households that
supply less labor at lower rates. The optimal tax code is therefore very slightly progressive.
29Mortality risk implies that the time discount factor is adjusted by the conditional probability of
survival. This adjustment is quantitatively important for elderly households and helps to generate
the falling portion of the hump-shaped life cycle consumption prole.
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In model M6 we add ex-ante heterogeneity among households, in the form of
permanent labor productivity di¤erences. This model element strongly a¤ects the
optimal labor income tax code, but leaves the capital income tax virtually una¤ected.
Given our social welfare function the government has a motive to redistribute be-
tween households of di¤erent ability types. A progressive labor income tax that taxes
high-earnings households at higher rates is exactly the appropriate tool for this type
of redistribution. Thus the labor income tax schedule becomes substantially pro-
gressive. One way to see this from Table IV is to notice that 0; the marginal tax
rate for highest earnings households, increases from 14% to 18%; mainly to com-
pensate for the lower tax revenues collected from low-earnings households. Further
introducing intracohort heterogeneity in the form of uninsurable idiosyncratic labor
productivity risk strengthens the case for progressive labor income taxes to provide
partial insurance against idiosyncratic labor income risk. Row M7 of Table IV shows
that, as a result marginal tax rates at low income levels fall, and they increase at
higher earnings levels (the highest marginal rate is now 0 = 23%) and for capital
income (the optimal capital income tax now is 35%).30
The introduction of tight borrowing constraints leads us back to our benchmark
30Aiyagari (1995) argues that uninsurable idiosyncratic risk in conjunction with tight borrowing
limits provides a rationale for positive capital income taxation even in the steady state of a model
with innitely lived households. In his model the government also chooses optimally the level of
government consumption which enters the householdsutility function additively. When we repeat
our public nance analysis in Aiyagaris (1995) model we nd consistently high capital income
subsidies as optimal. The optimal capital subsidy is about 45% in the Aiyagari model, calibrated
to the same targets as in our benchmark. These results are consistent with the theoretical analysis in
Davila et al. (2007) and demonstrate that Aiyagaris (1995) results depend crucially on government
consumption G being endogenous in his model.
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model, with results summarized in the last row of Table IV. As can be seen the e¤ect
of borrowing constraints on the optimal tax code is relatively minor. The reason for
this nding is two-fold. First, as explained above the use of progressive labor income
taxes allows to tax the young and poor at lower rates than older households. Second,
in crucial di¤erence to Hubbard and Judd (1986) the presence of idiosyncratic risk
induces precautionary saving even early in the life cycle. As the asset life cycle prole
in Figure 1 shows most young households nd it optimal to hold a small but positive
amount of assets. Consequently the borrowing constraint is not binding for most
households, and relaxing it has quantitatively noticeable, but no dramatic e¤ects on
our ndings (compare rows M7 and Bench in Table IV).
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we document how sensitive our results are with respect to the assumed
labor supply elasticity of households. Then we investigate whether it is optimal to
employ a progressive capital income tax schedule. We then study the dependence
of our results on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and on the form of the
social welfare function. Finally we discuss what happens if we allow the government
to accumulate (negative) government debt.
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6.3.1 Elasticity of Labor Supply
Our previous results for the optimal mix of capital and labor income taxes in our
model were based on the idea that older, high earnings households have a higher labor
supply elasticity than younger households. In this section we want to investigate
whether our ndings are robust to a di¤erent preference specication that implies
a lower (overall) labor supply elasticity. The functional form of the utility function
is given in (22): We choose as parameters a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of
1 = 2; and 2 = 3: The latter choice implies a Frisch labor supply elasticity that
is now substantially below one.31 For the remaining preference parameters (; ) as
well as the other model parameters we follow the same calibration strategy as above;
this yields  = 0:972 and  = 1:92 as new parameters.32
Under this new parameterization we nd as optimal tax code a marginal capital
income tax of  k = 21% and a marginal labor income tax rate of 0 = 34% and
1 = 18; implying again a at tax rate on labor with deduction of now $10; 800: So
whereas the main qualitative ndings of a signicantly positive capital income tax
and a at labor income tax with sizeable deduction remain intact, quantitatively
a reduction in the labor supply elasticity shifts the optimal tax mix towards lower
capital taxation and higher labor taxation.
Table V summarizes the changes in the aggregate variables under the optimal tax
31With this preference specication the the Frisch (constant marginal utility of wealth) labor
supply elasticity is equal to 1 l2l =
2
3 , while it was 1 in our benchmark.
32Of the other model parameters, the main changes in parameters occurred for the ones charac-
terizing the labor productivity process; the new choices are (2,,
2
) = (0:19; 0:995; 0:0841):
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system, relative to the benchmark. Qualitatively, the results are similar to the ones
in the previous section. Quantitatively, however, the decline in the capital stock,
output, consumption, and in particular labor supply is more substantial than with
nonseparable preferences. Despite a much more severe drop in aggregate consump-
tion the welfare gains are higher now than with Cobb-Douglas preferences, due to a
stronger reduction in hours worked and a more equitable consumption distribution.
Table V: Changes in Aggregate Variables in the Optimal Tax System
Variable
Average Hours Worked  2:70%
Total Labor Supply N  2:14%
Capital Stock K  7:44%
Output Y  4:08%
Aggregate Consumption C  3:75%
ECV 3:4%
6.3.2 Progressivity of Capital Income Tax
Our previous analysis restricted the capital income tax to be proportional. We
now document that this is not a binding restriction by allowing it to be progressive
as well. We initially specied Gouveia-Strauss functional forms for both labor and
capital income taxation, but since we found that the optimal tax functions are always
very well approximated by a at tax with deduction, we now document whether the
government should choose a positive deduction for capital income or not.
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Our quantitative (but not qualitative) results depend somewhat on the chosen
social welfare function, a point we will return to in section 6.3.4. In addition to
our benchmark ex-ante expected utility of a newborn agent we consider a Rawlsian
social welfare function that maximizes the minimum of lifetime utility across the
two di¤erent types (i.e. maximizes lifetime utility of the low ability type). We also
consider a social welfare function that maximizes lifetime utility of the high ability
type.
Under our benchmark welfare criterion of ex-ante utility of a newborn, allowing
for progressivity of the capital income tax does not improve welfare and the optimal
is given by the same proportional tax on capital income that we obtained above.33
The optimal tax system under the Rawlsian welfare function is a combination of a
30% marginal tax on labor income with a deduction of $11,500 and a 28% capital
income tax, while it is a 14% labor tax with a small deduction of $500 and a 37%
capital tax when only the welfare of the high type is valued. For both alternative
social welfare criteria it is not optimal for the government to make capital income
taxes progressive. The degree of progressivity in the labor income tax, in contrast,
depends crucially on which group of the population is given more weight by the
government.34
33As typical in this class of models our model understates wealth concentration at the top of the
distribution, relative to the data. This may weaken the case for progressive capital income taxes.
34We have examined various other social welfare functions. The one case where we found a capital
income deduction (of roughly $5; 000) to be optimal is when the government maximizes the sum of
steady state lifetime utilities of all generations. Note that this criterion (in addition to comparing
welfare across households of di¤erent ages) essentially double-counts old ages, once directly because
43
6.3.3 Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
In our benchmark economy the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion in consumption
(its inverse is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, IES) is given by   cucc
uc
=
 + 1   . Our benchmark choice,  = 4, implies an IES of about 0:5. Now we
perform sensitivity analysis with respect to our choice of ; in order to assess how
the elasticity of consumption growth (and thus savings) with respect to changes in
the after tax real interest rate a¤ects our results.
We restrict the tax code to be at with deduction on labor and at on capital,
to make the results comparable to those in the previous subsection.35 If we lower
the value of  to 2 (that is, increase the IES to about 3=4), the optimal capital
income tax is characterized by a marginal labor income tax of 18:9%, a deduction
on labor of around $5; 400 and a marginal capital income tax of 22:9%, substantially
smaller than in the benchmark.36 Increasing  to 8 yields a substantially higher
capital income tax of 52:4%; in conjunction with a marginal labor income tax of
19:1% and deduction of around $10; 300: The results are consistent with the ndings
in Imrohoroglu (1998), and conrm the intuition that increasing the IES (lowering
) shifts the optimal tax system towards labor and away from capital income.
of old households and once because of the years currently young households will spend in old age.
Since old households derive most of their income from capital, not surprisingly the optimal capital
income tax deduction is positive.
35This also applies to subsection 6.3.4.
36In this section the parameters are not recalibrated. If we recalibrate, the changes in results are
qualitatively similar, but di¤erences to our benchmark results become somewhat smaller.
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6.3.4 Social Welfare Function
In this section we document that our quantitative results are robust to di¤erent
specications of the social welfare function. We have already shown in 6.3.2 that a
Rawlsian maximin rule or a social welfare function that gives all the weight to the
high productivity types also produce substantially positive capital income tax rates.
We also compute the tax code that maximizes ex-ante expected utility, subject
to the constraint that none of the two groups is worse o¤ than in the status quo (i.e.
under the Gouveia-Strauss tax function). Compared to the unconstrained optimum,
lifetime expected utility of the high type has to be raised as the constraint is binding
for this group.37 The optimal way to do so is for the government to lower the marginal
labor income tax to 19%, with a deduction of $9,700. The optimal capital income
tax increases slightly to 44%. Although high type households are subject to a higher
capital income tax under this tax system, their after tax income increases due to
lower labor income taxes.
A Side Remark on Welfare along the Transition We characterize the optimal
tax system in the steady state. In many optimal policy analyses focusing on steady
states is problematic since it ignores the transitional welfare costs or gains associated
with the economy converging to the new steady state. Here we would like to point
out that the substantially positive capital income tax that we found optimal leads to
37Without these constraints welfare gains for the low types are in the order of 2.5% and welfare
losses for the high types amount to about 0.5% in terms of CEV.
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a capital stock that is signicantly below the status quo. Thus, along the transition
path the capital stock falls and can be partly consumed by transitional generations.
While it is computationally infeasible to compute the entire optimal tax transition
we conducted some experiments to mimic such an exercise. Restricting the tax
code to a proportional capital income tax and a proportional labor income tax plus
deduction, we ask what is the optimal once and for all tax reform. That is, starting
at the status quo the constant marginal labor and capital income tax rate ( l;  k) are
chosen, and the deduction in every period along the transition adjusts to guarantee
budget balance. In order to dene optimality we again have to dene a social welfare
function that now incorporates wellbeing of transitional generations.
In order to highlight the role of the transition we used a utilitarian social welfare
function among all generations currently alive in the initial steady state. We nd
an optimal capital income tax of  k = 65%; with the labor income tax at  l = 10%;
which together implies a sizeable deduction. Taxing income from capital that has
already been accumulated is nondistortionary. In addition, transitional generations
do not bear the full burden of the lower capital stock and hence lower wages (since
the drop in both takes time) but benet from a larger share of output available for
consumption (since net investment is negative along the transition). The resulting
tax system is therefore even more strongly geared towards capital income taxes.38
38See Greulich and Marcet (2008) for a recent analysis of optimal tax reforms in Chamley-Judd
type models.
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6.3.5 Government Debt
As discussed above Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Garriga (2003) prove theoretically
that the optimal capital income tax in the steady state of an OLG model with-
out idiosyncratic risk and type heterogeneity is zero if the tax schedule can di¤er
by household age (and preferences are weakly separable between consumption and
leisure and homothetic in consumption). In his quantitative work Garriga (2003)
demonstrates, for our non-separable benchmark preference specication, that for
particular values of the social discount factor of the Ramsey government the optimal
steady state capital income tax is zero, but with implied large negative government
debt positions. In this section, we therefore would like to discuss how our quantitative
results are a¤ected by relaxing the balanced budget assumption.
Government debt enters the steady state government budget constraint and the
asset market clearing condition. We calibrate government debt such that, under the
benchmark tax function, the debt/GDP ratio is given as specied in the rst column
of the table. As in the previous subsections the government chooses the optimal tax
code by maximizing over a at capital income tax  k, and a progressive labor income
tax function dened by at marginal tax  l above the deduction dl.
When debt is negative, the government owns part of the physical capital stock
in the economy and can use its interest income to partially nance government ex-
penditures. With the additional revenue, the government can reduce tax distortions
by lowering marginal tax rates or improve insurance and redistribution by increasing
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the exemption level dl. In addition to this direct revenue e¤ect, lower tax rates on
capital and labor income induce more savings and higher labor supply, as shown
in the last two columns of Table VI. This in turn enlarges the tax base and enables
the government to further decrease the tax rates required to nance its expenditures.
The results of the table indicate that optimal capital income taxes fall as government
debt declines, but remains signicantly positive even if the government holds massive
amounts of positive assets. To obtain zero capital income taxes as optimal under our
benchmark social welfare function the government would need to essentially own the
entire capital stock in the economy (in which case it can nance most of its spending
through returns on its assets).
Table VI: Government Debt and the Optimal Tax System39
Debt/GDP ratio  k  l dl r w K hours
-100% 24% 20% $13,400 3.43% 1.113 1.364 1.019
-20% 39% 20% $10,800 5.29% 1.025 1.073 1.004
0% (benchmark) 43% 20% $10,200 5.59% 1.000 1.000 1.000
20% 43% 20% $9,500 6.37% 0.982 0.938 0.985
100% 55% 21% $4,000 9.33% 0.885 0.703 0.984
39Wages, capital and hours are normalized by their values in the zero-debt optimum. To simplify
comparisons across economies with di¤erent Debt/GDP ratios in this table we maximize over at
capital income taxes and at labor income taxes with deduction, rather than the full Gouveia-
Strauss tax function. This explains that the optimal capital income tax in this table di¤ers from
that reported in Table IV.
48
7 Conclusion
In this paper we characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax code in a large
scale overlapping generations model where uninsurable heterogeneity and income risk
generate a desire for redistribution and social insurance. We nd that a system that
taxes capital heavily and taxes labor income according to a at tax with sizeable
deduction is optimal in the long run.
We have argued that the key driving force behind the capital income tax result
is the life cycle structure of our model in conjunction with endogenously chosen
labor supply. We also show that the assumed labor supply elasticity is important
for the large size of the optimal capital income tax, but not its existence. With the
alternative preference specication it remains signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Given our ndings that the life cycle structure of our model is crucial for our
results, future research should investigate how sensitive our ndings are to a more
detailed modelling of institutions a¤ecting life-cycle labor supply and savings incen-
tives, in particular the social security and Medicare system. Similarly, so far we have
abstracted from any linkage between generations due to one- or two-sided altruism
(see Fuster et al., 2007 for such a model and application to social security reform). In
light of the classical results on zero optimal capital taxation in dynastic models it is
conceivable, and subject to future research, that an incorporation of these elements
into our model brings its implications for the optimal tax code somewhat closer to
the classical results on optimal capital taxation.
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